
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7 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary Vance, Saturday, 5 December

- 1. At Mr. Vance's request (as suggested by Mr. McCone the day before), I called on Secretary Vance at his office on Saturday, 5 December, at 9:15 a.m. The conversation was related entirely to the problems of CORONA and the overall problems of NRO organization. It lasted approximately 1 1/2 hours.
- 2. Mr. Vance said he had talked to Mr. McCone over the phone but had not been too thoroughly familiar with the problem. He had subsequently talked to McMillan but not in any depth and did not know the details. He asked me to brief him in full on exactly what the problem was.
- 3. I told Secretary Vance that the immediate problem rested on the West Coast and had to do with two directives issued by McMillan, both of which I had protested by cable and had thus far received no reply to either cable. I told him that Lt. Colonel Webb, an Air Force officer detailed to the CIA, was the senior operations officer as well as the contracting officer for the CIA at the Advanced Projects Office at LMSC in Pale Alto. I said that Lt. Colonel Webb was assigned to this job in July, 1964, and succeeded Colonel Murphy, another Air Force detailee who had subsequently been assigned to Program A. I told him that Webb was operating under identically the same instructions as Murphy had had and as Murphy had passed to the on 14 April. I told Vance that the first time I knew that a problem existed in our relationships at Palo Alto, Sunnyvale, and Vandenberg, was on 30 November when McMillan told me that he was thinking of replacing Webb -- that Webb was stupid, uncooperative, and



an obstructionist. I told him that I had told McMillan that his evaluation did not conform to the opinion my people held for Webb -- that Webb was doing a superior job under most difficult conditions, being an Air Force officer "in the middle." Also, that he should take a good look at the status of Webb since he was detailed to the Central Intelligence Agency and in this position his assignments were a matter of interest to the Agency. I told Vance that the following morning I was informed of McMillan's unilateral action relieving Webb from detail to CIA, reassigning him to Sunnyvale in 72 hours and, furthermore, changing the entire communications and decisionmaking procedures at Palo Alto and at the Satellite Test Center. I told Vance I had protested both of these actions in the strongest possible terms and, after receiving no response in 24 hours from McMillan, I had turned the entire problem over to Mr. McCone. This, I said, had generated Mr. McCone's telephone call to Vance after his having talked to McMillan.

4. I then reviewed in considerable depth the manner in which the Satellite Operations Center under NRO communicates with Advanced Projects at Palo Alto under the CIA who in turn communicates with the Satellite Test Center under at Vandenberg. I explained the communications setup, the chain the manner in of command, the relationship with which operations were conducted while a satellite was in orbit, and all other factors having a bearing on the problem. I read excerpts from Colonel Webb's cables protesting the precipitous action both of his transfer and of the change of responsibilities. Mr. Vance was attentive throughout and asked a number of quite pertinent questions, all of which I answered as objectively as I could. Finally Mr. Vance said that he had had a conversation with McMillan the day before and that McMillan had agreed to stand down and postpone all actions on this problem until it could be worked out with Vance, Mr. McCone, and others. I told Secretary Vance that this satisfied me completely and that Mr. McCone would be most happy to know this.

5. We then discussed the general problem of NRO and the dichotomy of direction involved. Both of us agreed it was an untenable situation and must be straightened out. We discussed at some length various methods by which it might be straightened out and I left with the impression that Mr. Vance's position would be that the entire operation be turned over to the Department of Defense. He said he would look forward to discussions with Mr. McCone and Mr. McNamara and himself as soon as the three of them could get together.

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Marshall S. Carter Lieutenant General, USA Acting Director

